Managers need a ready supply of raw matoials and services, as wdl as a ready market for their firms' outputs. The business arratigements tbat are used to control tbese risks are forms of vertical integration. Tbey tnay include vertical acquisitions, or intemal devdo{«ient of supplying or distributing units, or otber means of extending firms' control over outsiders.
Managers need a ready supply of raw matoials and services, as wdl as a ready market for their firms' outputs. The business arratigements tbat are used to control tbese risks are forms of vertical integration. Tbey tnay include vertical acquisitions, or intemal devdo{«ient of supplying or distributing units, or otber means of extending firms' control over outsiders.
The Phenomenon of Vertical Integration
Vertical integration is a corporate strategy tbat has been misunderstood. It has lotig been a key force in tbe development of bigb productivity and managerial scqibistication in U.S. business (Cbandler, 1977) . Vertically integrated corporations bave been key engines of cbange in tbe past and bave enbanced sbarebolder wealtb (Lubatkin, 1982 ). Yet earUer findings tbat "dominant verticals" (Rumelt, 1974) and vertical mergers were least successful as diversifications (Baker, Miller, & Ramsperger, 1981) may bave soured mana^rs and academic researcbers on tbe usefulness of tbis strategy unnecessarily. Oftentimes researcbas did not recognize tbat votical integration could be an effective strategy, provided it was used pnutently, because tbey often took an overly aggregated view of it. Because critics bave not discemed bow tbe impOTtant dimensions of vertical integraticm be adapted over time (as industries cbange). tbey have not recognized how to make this a more durable and keen competitive weapon. Because successful vertical integration strategies require the cooperation of several strategic business units (SBUs), the formulation of such strategies is in the province of the chief executive officer (CEO). In some cases, effective vertical integration may even require temporary subsidization of one business unit at the expense of another. Decisions regarding sucb SBU coordination (and resource allocations among them) must be made by the chief strategists. Tbus effective vertical integration strategies need to refiect botb business unit and corporate level strategy requirements.
Tbis paper proposes a framework for developing effective vertical integration strategies. It was developed by syntbesizing tbe tbeoretical foundations establisbed by tbe industrial economics and strategic management literatures witb firms' observed behaviors. Thus it suggests a new way to look at vertical integration and the forces that affect firms' cboices concerning vertical linkages. It develops normative propositions conceming wbicb generic vertical strategies migbt be more appropriate under different competitive circumstances, and it uses examples of firms' successes or failures in using vertical integration to suggest bow traditional concepts of this strategy mi^t be amended to refiect effective industry practices. These suggestions are new hypotheses, which will require empirical testing. Vertical integration is one of tbe first diversification strategies tbat firms embrace. Unfortunatdy, some firms seem to use it in a manner that seems inappropriate for tbdr circumstances. Tbe issue of vertical inte^ation deserves additional analysis because it bas been misunderstood in tbe past, and because tbe development of a more rigorous means of analyzitig this strategy (and the performance it promises) cotild result in the formulation of more effective industry linkages, more rapid technological improvements, stronger global strategies, and better use of vertical integration. Table 1 summarizes many ofthe advantages and risks associated with vertical integration.
The narrow case in which a firm's major diversification strategy has been only vertical is not the focus of this inquiry. Instead, it considers the larger universe of firms that have linked two or more SBUs through vertical relationsbips and bave diversified in otber ways as well. Rumeh (1974) would bave found tbat many of tbe more diversified firms in his Fortune 500 sample also bad vertical transfers of goods or services in-bouse, bad tbat been tbe focus of bis inquiry. Tbus Rumelt reported tbat 22 percent of tbe firms in bis sample embraced a dominant vertical strategy in 1969 (up from 20 percent in 1949), but vertical linkages also existed witbin tbe bighly diver- during 1975-1978 indicated that only 4 percent were vertical. Thus an illusion was perpetuated that vertical integrations were rare, except in the ral, mbber, basic metals, and forest products industries. But, in fact, acquisitions that are classified as bdng otherwise "related" to tbe firm's core businesses may also bave provided new distribution cbannds or other assets that are vertically related to them. Acquired firms are bundles of assets rather than single business units, as Ocddental Petroleum discovered when courting Cities Service (and as Du Pont learned while absorbing Conoco). Acquisitions can offer vertical linkages as wdl as nonvertical diversifications. Corporate strategists must dedde whether to retain the business units acqtiired inddentally in this fashion; and if tbey are vertically rdated, strategists must dedde wbetber to encourage intrafirm commerce (subsidy) or demand arms-length transactions between vertical sister units. Thus, more seemingly unrelated mergers bave vertical elements to tbem tban is generally recognized, but oftentimes strategists see no advantage to encouraging vertical relationsbips between in-bouse units. Tbis may occur because tbe opportunities for vertical competitive advantage bave passed in some industries. In otber cases, bowever, tbis occurs because managers did not recognize bow to exploit tbe advantages of vertical integration effectively.
The Legacy of Vertical Integration
Vertical integration bas been an important managerial innovation and a necessary technological step in developing certain industries, but it may not be appropriate in tbe same form under all circumstances. For example, ownership of ore mines, ships, foundries, rolling mills, and fabricating plants was necessary for steel companies to lower costs and improve productivity in the 1890s. In its early years. Ford Motor Company owned and operated every stage of processing from iron ore to Hnisb-and-trim operations (except tires and glass). In these early years, suppliers may not have berai as willing to share Ford's gamble in persua^ng consumers to purcbase "horsdess carriages," so Ford bad to devdop componraits to its spedfications for itsdf. Tliere were substantial economies assodated with vertical integration once FOTd bad overcome the public's resistance to ptu'ehasing this tiovel product, and these cost advantage rewarded Ford's gamble. Ford's integrated strate^ and logi^ical system enabled large numbers of consumers to afford low priced and reliable automobiles in 1910 (CbamSa, 1977 because it lowered FcH-d' s costs of (^-ocurement, standardized its components, and fadlitated an end-to-end production process. Tbis is tbe type of vertical integration bebavior one tnigbt expect witbin emerging industries wbere firms must provide tbdr own infrastmctures and otber supplies.
By 1983, bowever, tbe automobile industry bad matured sucb tbat uncertainties regarding generic product demand were reduced. Ford's outside supl^iers were willing to invest in tooling and otber assets to supply tbe autotnakers, and bigb degrees of internal transfers were no longer necessary if uneconomic. (And tbe throughput of U.S. automakers was not large enough for vertical integration to remain as economic as it once was.) The challenge from Japanese automakers was difficult to meet when firms sucb as Ford were so strategically infiexible. Moreover, vertical integration bad lost some of its attraction because managers (wbo often resented baving to buy from sister units) did not understand tbe role tbat vertical integration played in tbdr firm's corporate scbeme. Often finns did not have the supporting mechatiisms needed to reap the maximum synergies that migbt be available from vertically integrated linkages, or tbey tnisapidied tbem in otber ways (Williamson, 1975) . In brief, in tbeory, many firms favor making ratber tban buying key resources and se^ces, but their inabilities to matiage integration taint thdr appredation of this strategy. Moreover, the use of vertical int^ratim must change with time. The competitive damage created by excessive integration can be substantial, as in the examples of the U.S. automobile and sted industries in 1983.
Antitrust dedsions also have created a tarnished image of vertictd int^'ation. Economists, wbo did not consider tbe particular requisities of diverse firm's corporate strategies, bave rdnforced a unidimensicmal view of vertical integraticHi based on tbeories of market power and tbe ideal of perfectly competitive industries (Addman, 1979; Blair & Kaserman, 1978; Comanor, 1967; Dennison, 1939; Frank, 1925; Jewkes, 1930; and Lavington, 1925) . Tbese scholars largely have not recognized that different motives for vertical integration-such as technological leadersbip, to secure access to raw materials, or competitive preemption-migbt exist witbin tbe same industry; nor bave tbey considered tbe diversity of ways in wbicb vertical integration strategies migbt be formed (Adams & Dirlam, 1964; Qevenger & Campbell, 1977; Greenbut & Obta, 1979; Larson, 1978; Mancke, 1972; Perry, 1980) . For example, firms vary in bow many tasks tbey perform in-house, in the number of buyer-seller linkages downward in a vertical chain they forge, and in the form of control employed. Few economic scholars, except perhaps Bork (1954) , McCSee and Bassett (1976) , anti Porter (1980) , have recognized the ways in which vertical integration could make industries more competitive (rather tban less so). Most economic scbolars bave beld one view of vertical integration, a view based beavily on tbe convenient assumption of a monopolist, instead of considering bow firms migbt use tbis strategy differently.
Because industry structures differ, it is not surprising tbat many approacbes to vertical control could satisfy managers' needs for a ready supply of raw materials or a ready market for tbeir factories' output. Tbe successes some firms bad witb strategies of full integration, long vertical cbains, and otber variations is surprising, bowever. Some firms, such as Robert Hall or Botany Industries, have suffered notable failures from vertical integration of the wrong type and/or its use at the wrong time (Harrigan, 1983a) . But if managers better understood the many dimensions of vertical integration and the key forces that affect their abilities to execute vertical strategies well, they could better avoid fundamental errors assodated with vertical integration and maximize the benefits available in joining dissimilar but rdated businesses. Briefiy, managers would not attempt to create synergies in cases where external forces made integration too risky or thdr intemal systems made communicatiotis inadequate.
A New Look at Vertical Integration
The dd concept of vertical integration as being 100 percent owned operations that are physically interconnected to supply 1(X) percent of a firm's needs is outinoded. Under !^q>r(9riate drcumstances, quality control and access to stable supplies can be obtained through quasi-int^ration arrangements. Firms could contract for R&D services, for example, to utilize the technology of genetic engineering in product devdopment, or they could form joint ventures to obtain this capability. Finns could bave components engineered to tbdr tigbt and bigbly spedfic instmctions by outsiders, as do Japanese automobile manufacturers, for example. And if tbeir bargaining power is sufficient, firms can use a kanban or "just in time" system of inventory control tbat sbifts tbe burden of bolding costs to tbeir suppliers (Obmae, 1982) .
If firms prefer not to use outsiders as extensions of tbdr corporate entity, a variety of otber vertical arrangements are possible. Some firms may conclude that they need not undertake certain activities at all. Eli Lilly, for example, uses outsiders exclusively with success to merchandise its ethical Pharmaceuticals. Tandy/Radio Shack, by contract, uses primarily its own retail outiets to distribute personal computers, but it has been increasing its use of outsiders. In other situations, firms may find that tbey can enjoy tbe integration economies, uncertainty reduction, competitive intdligence, and otber benefits tbat intemal vertical linkages may provide tbrotigb outsiders. The key in using vertical integration is recognizing which activities to perform in-house, how to relate these activities to each other, how much of its needs the firm sbould satisfy in-bouse, bow mucb ownersbip equity needs to be risked in doing so, and wben tbese dimensions sbould be adjusted to accommodate new competitive conditions. Briefiy, tbe concept of vertical integration sbould be expanded to encompass a variety of arrangements by wbicb tbe firm cim use outsiders (as well as its own business units) to forge an optimal vertical system for supplying goods, services, and capabilities.
The Dimensions of Vertical Strategy
In any vertical integration strategy, consdous (or unconsdous) dedsions are made regarding: (1) tbe breadtb of integrated activities undertaken; (2) tbe number of stages of integrated activities; (3) tbe degree of intemal transfers for eacb vertical linkage; and (4) tbe form of ownersbip used to control tbe vertical rdationsbip.
Breadth of Integrated Activittes
Tbe breadtb of integrated activities is tbe numbs of tasks tbat firms perform in-bouse. Firms performing many upstream or downstream tasks in-bouse are broadly integrated; firms performing few vertically related tasks are tiarrowly integrated.
Traditional concepts of vertical int^ration did not address tbe number of integrated activities tbat firms migbt undertake. Figure 1 contrasts tbe old view, represented by firm A, witb examples of tbe expanded concept of vertical integration proposed bere. In Figure 1 , firm A is not as broadly ititegrated as are firms B and C. Circumstances in wbicb firms migbt cboose tbe broadest integrations successfully are suggested elsewbere.
Stages of Integrated Aetivities
Tbe number of stages undertaken in tbe dimension of vertical integration tbat many traditional views have embraced. Figure 1 shows that firm A has more stages than firms B or C, because its activities extend from ultra-raw materials to retiiil ouUds, but firm C is engaged in a greater number of steps in the vatical chain. Although Rgure 1 depicts the transformation process as an extension of adjacent stages activities, it is possible for firms to skip a stage in the chain (by using outsiders for an intermediate processing step) in order to monitor costs better, to save on asset investments for fadlities that would be underutilized if brought in-house, or for otber reasons.
Degree of Internal Transfers
Tbe degree of integration is tbe proportion of a resource transferred intemally, and fully integrated firms transfer almost 100 percent of a particular service or material in-bouse. In Figure 1 only firm C is "taper integrated" with respect to services and materials upstream and downstream. Firms A and B are "fully integrated."
Form of Ownersbip Arraagement
The form of integrated ownersbip indicates the proportion of a firm's equity invested in a vertically linked venture, and in some environments carefully specified contracts, franchises, jinnt vmtures, or other forms of quasi-integration can be good alternatives to wholly-owned ventures. 
A In A, tbe strategic business unit is flanked by integrated sister tmits upstreani and downstream. Tbe firm is engaged in tnany stages of integrated activity, and all transfers of products and services witbin the vertical chain are made in-house (high degree of integration).
The relationship between any two business units in A is "fully integrated." B in B, the business unit's upstream atid downstream sisters engage in many activities. Tbus the firm is broadty integrated. Tbe firm is engaged in many stages of integration, but tbe tengtb of tbe vertical chain differs for various inputs. As drawn, tbe firm is "fully-integrated** for the inputs it does supply in B because it transfers those inputs in-bouse. C In C, the business unit purcbases more inputs^ or services from (or sells more to) outsiders than in B. Tbe firm is less broadly integrated tban in B. It is engaged in many stages of activity downstream for one output. It is taper integrated for many inputs, induditig product development services, because the business unit purchases some inputs and services from outsiders and sells some outputs to outsiders.
alternatives could be identified by the percentage of total eqtiity firms risked in a particular vertical rdationship. There are situations in which partial or no ownership may be preferred to wholly-owned vertical linkages.
Vetical Integration Strategy Alternatives
How can firms best manage thdr needs for scarce supplies or access to distribution channels? Several altematives are suggested that encompass the dimensicms of vertical integraticm strategy. The mix or combinations of tbese approacbes are bypotbesized to cbange over time, as industry conditions cbange or as firms' needs to control adjacent industries tightiy change (Sichel, 1973) . Tbese altematives are: nonintegration, quasi-integration, taper integration, and fuU integratim. Previous tbeories of vertical int^ra-don did not recognize tbe different dimensions comprising it; tbtis combinitig tbdr use to create generic strategy dtematives represents a new to tbinking about this problem.
Nonintegration. Strategies for attaining materials and markets with no internal transfers and no ownership are like contracts. They are espedally attractive when firms are reluctant to buy spedalized assets, need to lower breakeven points because of underdeveloped demand, or can arratige delivery schedules with suppliers (or distributors) as though they were extensions of the firm's assets. Koppers and Motisanto both used this approach to vertical int^ra-tion successfully in genetic engineering, in which demand was highly uncertain and technological cbange occurred rapidly, synergies were low witb ongoing businesses in 1981, and tbe figure bstd bigb bargaining power with respect to upstream and downstream markets. Firms risk the lowest proportion of thdr assets in vertical arrangements involving nonintegrated controls.
Quasi-integration. Quasi-integrated firms need not own 100 percent of the adjacent business units in tbe vertical cbain to enjoy tbe benefits of bonding tbdr interests to other firms' interests. The bond between rirms could take the form of cooperative ventures, minority equity agreements, loans or loan guarantees, prepurchase credits, spedalized logistical facilities or "understandings" concerning customary arrangements (Blms, 1972; Porter, 1980) . Downstream quasiintegration arrangements enable firms to retain a network of qualified distributors to maintain quality images. Upstream "take-or-pay contratts" andkanban arrangements enable firms to enjoy the advantages of vertical integration without assuming the risks of it. Whiskey distillers used quasi-integration successfully to penetrate diverse geographical markets, and microcomputer producers used it to obtain software and distribution of their products. The competitive scanning advantages of quasi-integration can be especially effective if firms using it devise intelligence gathering mechanisms to use the information that adjacent firms and competitors might provide.
Quasi-integrated arrangements place greater proportions of ownership equity at risk, but they also provide greater fiexibility in responding to changing conditions than a contract may provide. Tbe tbird ownersbip alternative, full ownersbip, is most freqently observed. It assumes tbat tbe firm exerts complete control over tbe activities of tbe vertically linked businesses. Full ownersbip risks tbe greatest proportion of equity, but many firms believe it is easier to manage tban contractual or quasi-integrated rdationsbips and prefer it over tbem (Harrigan, fortbcoming) .
Taper Integration. Wben firms are backward or forward integrated but rely on outsiders for a portion of tbdr supplies or distribution, tbey are' 'taper integrated." Sucb firms can monitor tbe R&D developments of outsiders, reduce vulnerability to strikes and shortages witbin their systems, and examine the products of competitors while enjoying tbe lower costs and greater advantages (and profit margins) or vertical integration. Under certain drcumstances taper integration is not necessary and firms can add substantial value tbrougb upstream or downstream activities, taper integration can be used effectively, as American Cyanamid did in etbical pbarmaceuticals by supplying basic and finisbed cbemicals to its Lederle Laboratories subsidiary wben it was convenient to do so but relying on outsiders to sut^ly chemicals in otber cases. Similarly Amoco (Standard Oil of Indiana) and many otber petroleum refiners found tbat upstream taper int^ration arrangemoits provided them with access to enough crude oil to keep thdr plants running economically, and that sdling a portion of thdr primary petrocbonicals to othra firms allowed them to gain scale economies through spedalization in processing downstream. Taper integration represents a useful compromise between desires to control adjacent businesses and needs to retain strategic fiexibility.
Full Integration. Physically interconnected technologies usually involve high degrees of internal transfers, but full int^ration also can be used effectively if price competition is not fierce, disecononmies from temporary imbalances are not significant, and little hardship occurs from bdng cut off from outside market or tecbnological intelligence. Transferring all of tbe firm's needs for a particular good or service in-bouse exposes it to increased risks of excess capadty, competitive infiexibility, and loss of infomiation concerning customer or competitive cbanges. Firms also face bigber capital costs and bigber exit barriers with this strategy (Harrigan, 1981 (Harrigan, , 1983b . Nevertheless, Brooks Brothers sells its own tailored suits with success, Courtaulds used its own rayon fiber in textiles, and PPG Industries used its own synthetic soda ash to make glass. These firms were fully integrated with respect to the materials named above without encountering the problems otber firms bave faced witb tbis strategy altemative. In general, it would seem tbat full integration works best witbin stable environments, but for corporate strategy reasons it may be necessary if outside suppliers or distributors are inadequate. Altbougb it seems generally wise to bave competitive antennae collecting intelligence upstream and downstream by enga^ng in some commerce witb outsiders, taper integration may not be necessary in some settings in wbicb full integration is tbe more profitable strategy.
Breadth and Stages of Integration. Firms tbat perform many activities involved in making a particular product (sucb as Pfizer in pbarmaceuticals and Tenneco in coal gasification) may enjoy synergies witb tbdr other businesses. Being broadly integrated also offers tbem opportunities to capture large profit margins by adding more vaiue themsdves. Firms that engage in several vertical stages for each integrated activity tbey undertake (such as Texas Instmments in miaocomputers and MOIHI in p^rcrieum refining) can enjoy these synergies at sevoal diverse levds within thdr organizations. They also can control cmdid aspects of tbdr produds' quality by par-tidpatii% at several stages in tbe ebain of processing. Ahbough it serans evident tbat integrating broad and long rangii% operaticms could be complex and costly, it is bypotbesized tbat in some cases it could be bigbly rewarding because sucb strategies lever:f irms' abilities to enter new markets, exploit new tecbtiolo^es, and evaluate tbe impact of evolutionary changes faster.
Particular cinnbitiations of the breadth of activities integrated, number of stages undertaken, degree of intemal transfers, and form of ownership control are more likdy to be successful for certain firms than others, depending on: (1) the uncertainty surrounding sales growth, industry infrastmcture, and other market traits; (2) tbe likelibood tbat tbe industry in question will undergo radical tecbnological cbange, severe price warfare, or otber stmctural cbanges causing competition to be volatile; (3) tbe power of firms to bargain, cajole, or pressure suppliers (or distributors) into performing value adding tasks for tbem; and (4) firms' strategy needs. (For example, more integration migbt be used if tbe firm's CEO concluded that it needed greater control over adjacent parties to attain tedmological leadership or other objectives.) It is important to nctfe tbat tbe most appropriate vertical integration strate^es will cbange over time as industry conditions cbange, as corporate strategy needs cbange, and as firms' capabUities evolve. Tbe CEO must assess tbe rdative wortb of tbe strategy altematives sketcbed above in ligbt of tbe forces tbat key factors exert on tbe dimensions of vertical integration.
Factors Affecting Vertical Strategies
Four key factors are bypotbesized to affect tbe vertical integration strategies tbat firms embrace: (1) forces propelling industry evolution and exacerbating demand uncertainty; (2) tbe nature of competition in the linked industries; (3.) the bargaining power of suppliers or distributors (and customers); and (4) corporate strategy requirements. Table 2 details the effects of these factors on the dimensions comprising vertical strategy altematives. From this [ffesentation and the discussion bdow, certain combinations of these dimensions are shown to be more apptopnate tban otbers wben tbe key factors occur togetber in certain ways.
Fwces Propeili^ bdnsbr Evolutioii
Induaries evdve in Aructure as firms make diverse investments in tbem and ovQ-come customers' reluctance to adopt new products (or new generations of products). Tecbnologic^ iimovation is a major cause of accderated industry evolution and of increased detnand uncertainty. Different vertical integration strategies will be more appropriate if tecbnology cbanges rapidly (or slowly), depending on wbetber firms would be tecbnological leaders or followers. Pioneering firms would be more likely to integrate tban would tecbnological followers. Witb tbis exception, bowever, less vertical integration is expected early (and late) in an industry's evolution in contrast witb tbe scenario Stigler (1951) envisioned, because of (1) tbe risks of demand uncertainty and (2) differing needs to prove a new product's wortb. Tberefore, tbe most likely pattern of integration bebavior one migbt expect to see overtime (bolding otber factors constant) is an inverted U-sbape.
Demand Uncertainty. Wben demand conditions become stable, bigber degrees of intemal integration migbt be undertaken witb ease because one firm's sales volumes can become large (and regular) enough to absorb the output of adjacent plants without incurring costly excess capadty penalties. Because it would take time for the experience spurring sales growth to occur, one would not expect firms within many embryonic industries (as well as declining industries) to be broadly integrated or engaged in many stages of integrated opo^ons. Demand for products in embryonic and declining settings may be highly uncertain. The chief strategist may elect for tbe firm to undertake more activities or more integrated stages in settings in wbicb pioneering investments are necessary to acbieve otber corporate objectives, sucb as tbe creation of infrastmdures, particularly if existing distribution cbannds are blocked or inappropriate for tbe firm's needs.
Creating Credibility for New Industries. Vertical integration bebaviors in new industries would be expected to differ from those in established industries and to differ from behaviors within raibryonic industries that began in the previous century. There were significant differences in the need for infrastmctures-cbamiels of distribution, standard means of assessing quality, and so on-supporting tbe devdopment of tbe embryonic steel, automobile, and tobacco industries of tbe last century compared witb tbose surrounding tbe embryotiic industries of tbe 1980s. In newly devdoping countries and earlier in tbe development of U.S. business, it frequently was Costs of managing quasi-integrated rela,tionship exceed benefits of this control system Contractual problems could stymie strategic flexibility and run up administration costs net^^sary for firms to undertake many stages of intcgx&ted activities (and to provide the necessary infrastructures) in order to help an industry to develop. But ROW nmny new industries can use the same infrastructures devdoped in an earlier era by firms that 646 once integrated vertically to build them. The major reason for pioneering firms within embryonic industries to undertake many stages of integrated actiwtiy now would be to create credibility for a radical new industry. This was once the case in persuading textile firms to use rayon as well as cotton and wool on their looms; and Celanese forward integrated from rayon to yarn, textiles, and garment manufacture to prove to consumers, as well as textile firms, that its new fiber (rayon acetate) was viable. Similarly ALCOA once forward integrated beyond its current number of integrated stages to fabricate aluminum products to sell to consumers when other metals fabricators would not use its new metal. In the 1980s, however, there seem to be few new industries (except, perhaps, genetic engineering) for which this need to create new market conduits is as high as it was in earlier eras.
When the risks of launching an embryonic industry are quite high, firms can form joint ventures to link supplies and distribution charmels; and when demand conditions become stable and certain patterns of competition are recognized as being more successful than others, more internal integration can be safely undertaken. When demand is declining, however, the first linkage that firms in declining industries might be expected to sever are those with owned distribution channels, because making demand dependent on an independent market enables firms to assess more clearly whether pockets of enduring demand exist for the product in question (Harrigan, 1980) . This is what Celanese did in acetate, IHamond Shamrock did in acetylene, and Brown Shoe did in leather tanning. In summary, except for the unique situations mentioned above, specialized suppliers or distributors are better suited to provide goods and services to firms in embryonic industries on a contractual basis until uncertainties concerning demand and competitive viability are resolved.
Volatility of Competition
Individual business units would not be expected to favor vertically integrated strategies in settings in which industry structures exacerbate the likelihood of price warfare and depressed profit margins. Because volatile industry structures increase the likelihood that competition will degenerate into the use of tactics that devastate long term profitability and sap the irmovative resourcefulness of firms, vertical integration generally should be avoided in such settings. Other things held constant, the greatest number of successful linked stages and the greatest successful breadths of integrated activities would be expected within settings in which competition is stable. The characteristics of hostile industry structures have been developed in detail elsewhere (Harrigan, 1980; Porter, 1980) . The elements of industry structure that affect vertical int^ration include: product traits, supplier traits, consumer traits, manufacturing technology traits, and competitor traits.
Product Traits. Because differentiated products can justify higher prices (Bain, 1968) , higher degrees of intemal transfer can be undertaken for such products with greater success even when integration economies are not substantial. In choosing which components or services to produce in-house, however, it is important to understand which attributes of a product create those qualities for which consumers are willing to pay a premium. Noncritical components and services (and those offering poor economics) could be purchased from outsiders and sensitive components and services (and those offering the best economics) produced in-house. By freeing plant space and resources that formerly were devoted to noncritical and uneconomic components and services, firms can undertake a more profitable mix of activities with their resources while tying up the assets of outsiders for low profit activities.
If trade secrets protect some aspect of a firm's products, higher degrees of integration are necessary, as in the case of Polaroid, which stopped purchasing its negative materials from Kodak when its instant photography patent expired. (Too much proprietary information was contained there to let competitors produce it.) Similarly, Schlumberger acquired its own custom logic semiconductor house (Fairchild Camera & Instrument) to protect its proprietary knowledge conceming well-logging services, and Dow Chemical often is fully integrated to prevent other firms from learning too much about its processes and designs.
Supplier Traits. The principal motives for firms to integrate backward often include capturing high proportions of value added, controlling product quality (and proprietary knowledge), or overcoming competitors' advantages if the best suppliers are already under contract to others. If competition is escalating on the basis of innovations, however, firms should be wary about embracging high degrees of intemal transfers because they cut off their access to the benefits of outsidtfs' innovations in an enviroiunoit in which flexibility is crucial to competitive abiUty. In such settings, it may be desirable to hdp create another new supplier (through quasi-integration arrangements, which allow the new entity to serve others as well as sponsoring taper integratioa firm) rather that fall into the trap of technological inflexibility by fuUy owning such suppliers and buying inputs only from than.
Consumer Traits. The principal reasons to integrate forward often indude capturing high proportions of value added, controlling the quality and im-3^ of one's products, and raising customers' switching cost barriers (Porter, 1980) . Compiex products that require substantial demonstration or explanations and servicing (as microcomputers did in 1978) are strong candidates for downstream linkages. In doing so, firms must be cautious to ensure: (1) that they are not overly dependent on in-house merchandise for resale and (2) that they do not stay forward integrated after the advantages of being so integrated have expired. When products become successful enough to create high customer switching costs, the need for forward integration is lowered, and firms should move away from battlefronts unless they are well positioned to win price wars.
Manufacturing Technology Traits. The technology used in manufacturing must offer substantial integration economies in order for vertical integration to be advantageous (Khandwalla, 1974) . Because the minimum efficient scale of some technologies is so much larger than firms' needs for that component, firms that integrate such activities may be forced to enter merchant sales to dispose of their unused outputs from the oversized plant (or run the plant at uneconomic volumes). Integration should be avoided if the costs of excess capacity caimot be offset by charging premium prices. Instead, firms should use subcontractors to perform those tasks that require assets that most firms wouid use infrequently at present operating scales. Thus, producers of solar collector panels send out for chrome plating, and ethical pharmaceutical firms send out for the bromine chemistry step in production.
Firms must keep aware of their distinctive competences in production to ensure that: (1) their critically skilled laborers-sdentific researchers and engineers-are employed Qest they be hired away by ctmpetitors), and (2) they avoid being stuck with obsolete assets. If firms are constrained by plant space, it may be wise to purchase simple or low volume componoits from outsiders. Critically skilled onployees thereby can be kept busy on difficult (but challenging} tasks that lev^age firms' future capabilities to cmnpMe, ud the burden of thdr salaries am be qxead ova high vduiae supidying activities. Finally, if technology is changing raindly, using outsiders to perfonn key intermediate processing steps reduces the likelihood that firms will be stuck with vertical resources that become high exit barriers. As long as demand is increasing and firms can avoid price wars in selling thdr output, vertical linkages will not exacerbate the tendency for competition to become volatile; but unless spedal efforts are made to overcome these forces, vertical linkages can become high exit barriers as industries mature (Harrigan, 1983b) .
Competitor Traits. Efforts made to diminish the pressures of other structural traits toward price warfare can be done by competitors who (1) compete on the basis of price or (2) use vertical integration as a means of foreclosure. "Dominant verticals," the group of narrowly diversified, integrated firms that Rumelt (1974) identified, are most likely to possess the types of strong commitments to vertical integration strategies that function like exit barriers, causing them to act irrationally, by cutting prices to niaintain high throughputs in thdr integrated fadlities to the detriment of other competitors.
Firms that use their vertical linkages as a means of foreclosing nonintegrated firms from access to materials, markets, innovations, and competitive intelligence also are damaging competitors because they can escalate the evolution of the industry towards defensive vertical integrations. When many firms have integrated, all face similar pressures to keep thdr vertical chains efficiently utilized, and price competition becomes more likely than if nonintegrated firms were allowed to supply or purchase excess volumes of tnaterials and services to alleviate imbalances in vertically related technologies. Thus it may be preferable for an industry to have some nonintegrated firms to absorb other firms' excess capacity, lest industry bloodshed result instead.
In summary, high degrees of internal transfer, long vertical chains, and many integrated activities are expected in settings in which industry structures do not exacerbate price warfare or rapid rates of change in products or processes. Because competitors must be able to change tactics rapidly in turbulent industry settings, a highly integrated posture in such settings could reduce a firm's maneuverability and damage its profitability. Even the partial reprieve of substanti^ integration economies or the ability to charge premium prices to pay for costly idle capadty may not offset the long tom corporate damage that being too highly integrated in such settings could create. The tradeoffs that firms will make depend on their overall strategies and market power. 648
Firms that possess the bargaining power needed to obtain secure access to suppliers and distribution channels without damaging thdr strategic flexibility could reduce thdr asset exposure and inflexibility by redudng ownership stakes in supplying or distributing business units. Another way is to use the firm's bargaining power to persuade sequent businesses to assume the duties that a firm wishes to avoid (MacMillan, Hambrick, & Pennings, 1982) .
The most important determinants of bargaining power are: (1) product specifidty to the industry in question; (2) existence of alternative outlets or sources of suppliers; (3) ability to self-manufacture the good/service in question; and (4) dependence of the supplier (or distributor) on the business unit (Porter, 1976a) . If firms possess the power to leverage thdr market positions, they could use this power to control adjacent firms' assets without owning them. Firms that control brand names or patents, for example, could hire outsiders to market thdr products if communications with downstream parties are less important than other advantages that such arrangements might provide. But if firms' suppliers or distributors possess bargaining power (and if they cannot be persuaded to perfonn useful services for firms) then those activities may have to be undertaken inhouse in order to attain the control that some firms desire. If this situation occurs in settings in which demand is unstable and competition is volatile, the outcome of doing so could be disastrous.
Corporate Strategy Needs
The foregoing arguments that less integration is preferable to more must be moderated by considerations of corporate strategy needs. Because vertical integration can be costly if used imprudently, corporate strategists must scrutinize the advantages they hope to capture by condoning (or denying) the creation of certain vertical rdationships. Votical integration may be part of a larger strategy involving shared resources and experience curve economies for some businesses, for example, requiring the firm to sustain relationships that the strategy framework otherwise would not recommend.
Some vertical integrations promise to improve long term synergies for the entire firm, although they appear to penalize a particular business unit. Supply side economies, for example, could be gained by sharing manufacturing fadlities for components that could be used in several dissimilar i voticai iitt^ration strategies that increase or enhaace innovations by sharing technological infonnation common to separate stages of int^raticm may requre more int^ration than the framework suggests.
The number of stages undertaken, for example, would be expected to be highest if significant synergies are gained or other corporate needs are served. The key determinants of whether (or not) a firm should skip a particular stage in its int^rated chain of activities are the task's importance to its corporate mission and the quality of goods or services provided by outsiders. A firm's position within its industry also suggests how many integrated stages it would perform, and firms on the fringes of an industry would be more likdy to purchase (rather than produce) materials or services from leader firms whose upstream plants produce in excess of their downstream plants' capadties.
Although firms will vary considerably in which tasks they choose to do in-house, thdr needs to capture more value added would mean that they performed in-house those tasks for which their expensive and criticai resources were best suited. Firms also will integrate those tasks that woidd enable them to enjoy synergies with other business units, those that are important to thdr business missions, or that offer high profit margins for them. They most likely would own outright those aspects of thdr businesses that were most important to them, and they would pool the risks (or extend thdr control over adjacent firms) for less critical activities supplied by outsiders through quasi-integration arrangements.
The most scarce resource that firms possess is their entrepreneurial ability. Rather than sedng thdr mix of businesses as streams of cash fiows, diief executives should consider them as reservoirs of capabilities. Thus vertical integration strategies would encourage activities and rdationships for which personnel with crudal skills (or other scarce capabilities) might otherwise not be retained.
In previous sections, less vertical integration has been antidpated within turbulent settings, particidarly those in which techncdc^cal duutge occurs rapi(By. Firms pursuing techndogical leadersUp strate^es offer an important exception to this hypoth^s, however, because they often m:e wiBing to endue the tonporary imbalances of full integration whm {«oduc-ing sensitive components, and thef are wining to M>-sorb the risks of many int^-ated stages (as detailed in Table 2 ) in order to be prased <o ejqdcrit the next 649 gennaticm of tedmological innovation. Contrast, for eumide, the different vertical integration strategies observfd>le in the electronics industry for creating new generations of microprocessors and for produdng semiconductor memory chips. Firms will purchase components that are not close to thdr technological rares if better prices are available from outsiders. Yet they often continue to make some of these components in-house, even if they do not have cost advantages, in order to carry over knowledge to the next generation of active components for which they might sdze preemptive or cost advantages (MacMiUan, 1983 ). In Figure 2 , firms seeking technological, quality, or market share leadership are grouped in the lower rows of the strategy matrix, and those pursuing a generic "focus" strategy (Porter, 1980) are grouped in the top rows. Briefly, in an emerging industry, such as semiconductors, leadership objectives require a greater degree (and more stages) of vertical integration than do focused market niche objectives, because leadership is attained through attainment of integration economies (cost leadership) or command of proprietary knowledge (technological leadership). Finally, it is useful to recognize that any corporate scheme to force vertically related business units to deal with each other without the benefit of "open market" equivalents (for the purposes of transfer pridng and maintaining competitive fiexibility) is penalizing one party to the transaction for the sake of the other. Subsidization of uneconomic and noncompetitive business units for the sake of ephemeral corporate advantages is a strategic trap that should be csrefuUy scrutinized, lest the advantages gained in such subsidization arrangonents be outweighted by the impairments to competitive fiexibility that result. Global competition on several national fronts through an integrated, worldwide logistical system is one example of situations in which the benefits of encouraging vertical linkages are substantial and cross-subsidization may be necessary. Under such circumstances the linkages should be retained while a worldwide market position is being won.
Applications of the Vertical Strategy Framework
Analysis of the forces identified above that make vertical integration more (or less) successful could be applied in portfolio rationalizations and in the timing of key changes in vertical strategies. In cases in which firms gain bundles of assets through acquisitions, including businesses that may be vertically related to ongoing businesses, they could apply this framework to determine how best to use the new supplier/distributor relationship potential created by joining the two firms. In particular, the framework calls attention to situations in which strategists might divest vertical units and deploy released resources dsewhere, because it asks hard questions about the true nature of synergies and the place of vertical integration in corporate strategies.
The generic strategies suggested above and detailed in Table 2 are not intended to be static suggestions to gain access to resources, capabilities, and knowledge. As competitive conditions change, so too must the firm's vertical integration strategy. In particular, changes must refiect revisions in the strategic relationships that strategists envision among their business units. For example, GTE (a telecommunications firm that once had a significant electronics position but divested its semiconductors around 1969) purchased EMI Semi Inc. in 1979 because it recognized its need again for custom integrated circuit designs. Similarly, Tandy/Radio Shack adjusted its distribution polides to refiect new market realities in 1982 by selling some of its microcomputers through outsiders. Hoffman-LaRoche reduced its wholesaling activities (switching exclusively to outsiders); and Exxon brought its U.S. crude oil refining and production capacity back into balance with each other as competitive conditions changed.
When the "strategic window" that favored integration has closed (Abell, 1978) and the cost of emulating competitors' integrated strategies is no longer justified, prudent firms will uncouple thdr in-650 tegrated linkages in a timely fashion-before other firms reach similar conclusions about the merits of integration--to dispose of thdr assets in a healthy market. Firms attempting late disintegrations will face greater exit barriers than will early firms and will realize less value for thdr assets when they finally do locate a buyer for them (Harrigan, 1980; Porter, 1976b) . A key review point for dedding whether to reduce integration is when cash outlays would be required to upgrade vertically integrated technologies. Strategists must recognize that business units that are viable only if they have a guaranteed market (or source of supply) can become cash traps if they are not cut off at that time.
In summary, firms can form vertical joint ventures to obtain the distribution skills and resources they lack, they can purchase marketing contracts, or otherwise avoid risking too many assets in businesses whose product demand is highly uncertain (/ they possess the market power needed to take a position in businesses they deem too risky to wholly-own. They can use the leverage of their bargaining positions to shift risks to outsiders in a preemptive fashion if they can identify and link up with the best partners for joint ventures, contract processing, or sourdng arrangements. Firms could increase or decrease thdr breadth of integrated activities or their degree of intemal transfers in a timely fashion if they have accurately diagnosed the forces that make vertical integration strategies work well within some settings but not well within others. The key to successful use of vertical integration is recognizing whm and where it offers significant competitive advantages and forging the necessary vertical linkages without creating excessive risks.
Vertical integration can offer temporary state-ofthe-art advantages that must be wdghed against the advantages of being fiexible to exploit the next technological innovation. Firms that commit early to vertical integration, linking themsleves in a highly infiexible fashion to a particular technology, risk being wrong, and the cost could be substantial. But if these pioneers are right, vertical integration can be a rationalizing device that forges order in chaotic environments, establishes industry standards, or lowers operating costs significantly. Then the harm of late entry can be substantial. Thus, firms should build pilot plants early to learn about suppliers and distributors before competitors can match these intdligence gains with their own experience. (They could consider the investment a form of R&D.)
Vertical integration is not a costless strategy. Recogtiizing when outsiders can be entrusted with activities that firms might otherwise perform intemally is desirable when firms must ration funds, seek divestiture (or liquidation) candidates, or otherwise consolidate thdr business units' activities, as well as when they enter new businesses. The problem is a complex one, but the framework proposed herdn offers one way of analyzing firms' vertical integration capabilties and improving thdr strategies.
